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Galvan: Cram down under the New Federal Bankruptcy Code: The Effect of De

CRAM DOWN UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE EFFECT OF DEEMED
ACCEPTANCE ON THE CONFIRMATION
STANDARDS OF CHAPTER 11
On October 1, 1979, the new Federal Bankruptcy Code
of 19781 replaced the old Bankruptcy Act of 18982 as the
vehicle for bankruptcy procedures in the United States.
For the most part, the new Bankruptcy Code is the result
of a two year study conducted by the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.' Its purpose was to
inquire into the ability of the bankruptcy system as it
then existed to manage the increasing burden of bankruptcy
cases which resulted from the expansion of credit since
World War II.L The Commission concluded that the system
which had evolved under the old Act was poorly adapted
to providing either debtor relief or protection of creditors'
interests.'
First enacted in 1898,6 revised in 1938' and significantly modified by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in
the 1970's,' the Bankruptcy Act had been described as a
"hodgepodge" 9 whose sections were "out of date as well as
out of style' 0 by the late 1960's. A significant problem
lay in the area of interpreting bankruptcy court procedure
and practice, which had been completely revised by the
Supreme Court's Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Since the
Rules superseded any procedural provision of the Act which
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. An Act to establish a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies, Public
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (November 6, 1978) codifies and enacts
title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (Supp. II 1978).
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1976), which has been
replaced by the Federal Bankruptcy Code, supra, note 1. [hereinafter
cited as the Bankruptcy Act or as the "Act."]
3. Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States to analyze and evaluate the Bankruptcy Act in 1970. Pub.
L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). The Commission consisted of nine members,
three appointed by the President and two each by and from the Senate,
House and Judiciary. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
Part I, at 2. [hereinafter cited as Commissioners' Report.] Trost, Treister,
Forman, Klee, and Levin, The New Federal Bankruptcy Code, ALI-ABA
Resource Materials, at 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Trost, et. al.]
4. Commissioners' Report, supra note 3, at 2.
5. Id. at 3.
6. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 575, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), supra note 2.
7. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883, revised the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.
8. Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
9. Trost, et al., supra note 3, at 7.
10. Id.
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was inconsistent with them, much of the Bankruptcy Act
had been effectively repealed. However, since the inconsistent provisions remained in the statute even after promulgation of the Rules, it was often unclear which portions
of the Bankruptcy Act were "substantive" and therefore
unaffected by the Rules."
The substantive law in the Act, with the exception of
the dischargeability sections, were at least 40 years old' 2
and were, for the most part, ill-equipped to deal with postwar shifts in bankruptcy focus and caseload. 3 Interpretation of the substantive law was further complicated by the
fact that it was often controlled by state law, which had
itself changed significantly over the years, leaving an open
question as to whether the principles of the Act were being
served, 4 and contributing to the general lack of uniform
application of the bankruptcy law in the various federal
districts. 5
The Commission's study also questioned the efficiency
of the actual administration of bankruptcy cases under the
old Act.'" Far too much of the time, energy and expense of
bankruptcy administration was being consumed on cases
whose liquidated estates realized only enough money to
cover administrative costs, or less." These estates, as well
as larger estates, were being further reduced by the costs
of attorneys' fees for what was too often an unnecessary
adversary procedure, and the employment of attorneys to do
tasks which did not require legal skills. The Commission
also noted the lack of simplified procedures to record actions
in routine cases and the redundancy of paperwork involved
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Commissioners' Report, supra note 3, at 3. The number of bankruptcies
increased 1000% between 1950 and 1970. Id. at 1.
14. Trost, et al., supra note 3, at 7.
15. Commissioners' Report, supra note 3, at 4.
16. Id. at 8.
17. It cost $17 million to operate the bankruptcy system in 1972. Of this
amount, $6.7 million was spent on cases whose estates when liquidated
resulted in no assets or nominal assets sufficient to cover only the administrative costs of the bankruptcy procedure. In 80% of these cases, the
amount realized in a single case was less than $1000. Commissioners'
Report, supra note 3, at 3.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/11

2

Galvan: Cram down under the New Federal Bankruptcy Code: The Effect of De

1980

COMMENTS

703

in bankruptcy administration.' 8 As did an earlier study, 9
the Commission concluded that the bankruptcy system was
run more for the convenience (and profit) of official participants, than for efficient management."
BUSINESS REHABILITATION UNDER THE OLD ACT:

CHAPTERS X-XII

The business rehabilitation chapters of the old Act are
characteristic of the general disorganization and archaic
structure of the old bankruptcy system. 2 ' Business debtors
who chose rehabilitation instead of liquidation had to determine which of three separate chapters were applicable to
their cases. 2 In general, Chapter X 3 governed the reorganization of large corporate debtors. Chapter X12 1 provided for the adjustment of unsecured debts owed by
2
corporations, partnerships or individuals. Chapter X11 1
dealt with the adjustment of secured debt of individuals or
partnerships.
Each chapter had detailed and often overlapping rules
governing its availability to a particular business debtor,
which frequently generated pointless and wasteful litigation
in determining the applicable chapter. Furthermore, even
18. Id.
19. The Brookings Institute conducted a study of the bankruptcy system in
the late 1960's. Their study was published as Stanley, Girth, et al.,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM, (1971) and was relied upon
in the study conducted by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws.
Commissioners' Report, supra note 3, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Trost, et al., supra note 3, at 241.
22. Id. at 237.
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2, §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676
(1976). Chapter X was generally available for the reorganization of larger
corporations having publicly held securities and requiring a readjustment
of their secured debts. Chapter X was also available to close corporations,
but the difficulty of demonstrating that reorganization was feasible
generally precluded small corporations from attempting reorganization
0.09 at 101 (14th ed.
under that chapter. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1978); Nachman, Chapter X Corporate Reorganization in BANKRUPTCY AND
THE CHAPTER PROCEEDINGS 204 (G. W. Holmes ed. 1976).
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2, at §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799
(1976). Chapter XI cases enabled an individual, partnership or corporation to file a plan for the composition or extension of unsecured debts.
Hertzberg, Chapter XI Arrangement Proceedings in BANKRUPTCY AND THE
CHAPTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 23, at 283 (1976).
25. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2, at §§ 401-526, 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926
(1976). Chapter XII dealt generally with real property arrangements by
individuals or partnerships where the sole creditor or creditors were real
estate mortgagees.
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though more than one chapter might appear to be applicable
in a particular case, just as often, no one chapter seemed to
be precisely suited to the debtor's needs in many other
common business situations. 6 The result was often the net
reduction of the proceeds which were to be shared by the
competing interests.
CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE

The new Federal Bankruptcy Code eliminates much
of this confusion by consolidating the treatment of all classes
of business debt and debtors into a single reorganization
chapter, Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code.27
Underlying this consolidation is an attempt to balance
substantively the competing interests of the debtor, secured
and unsecured creditors, and ownership interests, and to
expedite the reorganization procedure itself in order to
avoid the waste of money and effort apparent under the
Act. To this end, Chapter 11 of the new Code combines
those aspects of Chapter XI of the old Act aimed at facilitating the negotiation process with those of Chapter X
which were designed to protect the public interest. Still
other aspects of Chapter 11 are new. 9
26. Commissioners' Report, supra note 3, at 23.
27. Federal Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, at §§ 1101-1146 (1978). Former
Chapter VIII from the Bankruptcy Act, which involved railroad reorganizations is included under Chapter 11 as Subchapter IV. Chapter 11 is
subject to the general provisions of the Bankruptcy Code: Chapters 1
(definitions), 3 (case administration) and 5 (trustees avoiding powers).
In those jurisdictions designated pilot districts, Chapter 15 also applies.
Note also that the debtor retains the option of choosing liquidation under
Chapter 7, subject to certain limitations. Federal Bankruptcy Code, id. at
§ 1112. In liquidation, the debtor's property is gathered into an estate,
liquidated and the proceeds are distributed to creditors. In reorganization,
the debtor rearranges its debt structure under a reorganization plan and
continues in business. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L. J. 107 (1979).
28. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L. J. 107
(1979).
29. Id. Chapter X provided for the substitution of the independent trustee for
debtor control, the absolute priority rule, the active participation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the requirement of court approval
of a plan before solicitation of its acceptance and the ability to deal
directly with stockholders. Under Chapter XI, the "best interests of
creditors test" provided a more flexible basis for negotiation of a plan,
permitted the plan and acceptances to be filed with the petition, permitted
stockholders to retain their interests even though creditors' interests were
affected and generally permitted the retention of debtor management.
Trost, et al., supra note 3, at 237-239; King, supra note 28, at 107-108.
Chapter 11 expedites the process by eliminating the different treatment
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The central issue in a reorganization procedure is, of
course, the reorganization plan. A basic premise of the new
Chapter 11 is that the parties involved should be able to
negotiate a plan which promotes their interests with a
minimum of court intervention." This represents a major
departure from Chapter X of the old Act, which required
court approval of a plan before acceptance by creditors
could be solicited.3 Court approval was contingent on a
finding that the plan satisfied the "absolute priority
rule" and met and survived the "fair and equitable" test,"
which required that the claims of all senior interests be
paid in full before any junior interest was allowed to
participate in the plan. 3 The major drawback34 to this
requirement was that a determination of whether a plan was
fair and equitable had to be based on a valuation hearing
to determine the value of the business on a going concern
basis. Valuation hearings were criticized as time consuming and expensive and as resulting in little more than a
manipulated estimate" which determined whether a class
would participate in the distribution or be eliminated from
participation altogether. 6
Under Chapter 11, however, the court is not bound to
the absolute priority rule and its concomitant fair and

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

available to private and public corporations and thus the ambiguity involved in the initial selection of the chapter under which a business debtor
was going to proceed, as well as the need for conversion proceedings to
move a case from one chapter to another and the resulting uncertainty as
to how a case might be handled. Trost, et al., supra at 239, King, supra at
119. The role of the S.E.C. is modified. Id. at 108. Innovations in Chapter
11 include provisions for appointment of official creditors committees, the
full disclosure requirement, mandatory court confirmation upon approval
of the reorganization plan by a majority in each class of creditors and a
finding that the plan meets the best interests of creditors test, but with
a complex cram down provision based on the "fair and equitable" test in
the event a class of interests or claims rejects the plan. Id. at 107-108.
Id. at 108.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2, at § 176, 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1976).
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2, at § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
6A COLLIERS ON BANKRUPTCY 1 11.06 at 216 (14th Ed. 1977).
This is aside from the fact that a court could not approve a plan not
meeting the fair and equitable test, even if all affected classes had been
willing to accept it.
E.g., Commissioners' Report, supra note 2, at 27; King, oupra note 28, at
109; Bell, Valuation and the Probability of Bankruptcy in Chapter X, 52
AM. BANKR. L. J. 1 (1978).
King, supra note 28, at 109.
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equitable test. So long as the requisite majority 7 of each
class accepts 8 the plan on the basis of full disclosure" of
the debtor's financial condition, and certain other prerequisites are met,4" the court must confirm the plan upon
a finding that all holders will receive at least as much as
they would have received on liquidation, 1 and that the plan
is feasible and unlikely to result in liquidation.2" Only when
a court is required to confirm a plan over the dissent of a
class must the plan meet the fair and equitable test4 3 with
its requirement of a valuation hearing. Thus, Chapter 11
builds in a mechanism for the parties in interest to reach
agreement prior to the submission of the plan to the court."
Senior interests can avoid the necessity of a valuation
hearing if they can obtain the consent of junior interests
to the plan," thereby avoiding a possible reduction in the
distribution proceeds because of the expense involved in
holding valuation hearings. Junior interests will ordinarily
have a better chance of participating in the final distribu37.

38.

39.
40.

41.
42.
43.

44.
45.
46.

Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) provides that a class of
claims has accepted a plan if it has been accepted by holders of two-thirds
in amount and one-half in number of the allowed claims of that class.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (Supp. II 1978) provides that a class of interests
has accepted a plan if the plan has been accepted by holders of at least
two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests of such class.
A class of claims or interests which are not impaired under Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. II 1978) is deemed to have accepted
the plan and solicitation of acceptances from that class is not required.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (5) (Supp. II 1978).
The requirements for confirmation when each class of claims or interests
accepts the plan are, specified in Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (Supp. II 1978). For an explanation of the import of these
conditions see Klee, supra note 27, at 136-138.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (Supp. II 1978) provides
that if all of the requirements of § 1129 (a) are met except for the conditions imposed in (a) (8), the court shall confirm the plan on request of
the proponent of the plan if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and
is fair and equitable with respect to each class that is impaired under and
has not accepted the plan.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (Supp. II 1978) specifies
the conditions under which a plan will be found to meet the fair and
equitable test.
In the majority of cases in which plans are confirmed, it will be with the
consent of all parties in interest. Klee, supra note 27, at 133.
Since the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (Supp. II 1978)
provides that any class which receives nothing under the plan will be
deemed to have rejected it and since the existence of one dissenting class
allows the proponent to invoke the cram down provisions of 11 U.S.C.
1129(b) (see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (i)), senior classes have an incentive to
approve plans providing for distribution to junior classes which would
otherwise receive nothing in order to avoid the valuation hearing requirement.
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tion of proceeds if they accept a plan instead of forcing
uncertain valuation hearings which may preclude them from
receiving any of the proceeds if senior interests cannot be
satisfied in full. Finally, the proponent of the plan is encouraged to propose a plan which will be readily acceptable
to all classes of claims or interests in order to avoid the
valuation hearings47 and to expedite the resolution of the
proceedings.
To this end, the Code provides that a class which
receives nothing under the plan is deemed to have rejected
it.4" This provides an incentive for the proponent of the plan
and the participating parties to negotiate a plan under which
all classes receive something49 even though a class might
not have received anything under the fair and equitable
test or on liquidation, since the presence of even one dissenting class is sufficient to require a valuation hearing for
confirmation of the plan over its dissent.5" Conversely, any
class which is unaffected under the plan is deemed to have
accepted it,51 and the proponent of the plan need not go to
the time and expense of soliciting its acceptance.
The relationship between section 1126(f), ' 2 which
provides for deemed acceptance, and the confirmation
standards of section 1129(a) 5" creates an ambiguity which
is certain 4 to become a point of contention in future bank47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.

54.

King, supra note 28, at 109, Klee, supra note 27, at 134.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1126(g), (Supp. II 1978).
King, supra note 28, at 109.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. II 1978) is the
cram down provision of the Chapter and allows a plan to be confirmed
over the objection of dissenting classes of creditors so long as the requirements of § 1129(a) are met, with the exception of § 1129(a) (8), which
requires unanimous acceptance.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. II 1978) specifies
that a class which is unimpaired under the plan is deemed to have accepted
the plan.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (Supp. II 1978) requires that at least one class of claims or interests has accepted the plan
for confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) specifies that all classes must
be either unimpaired or must have accepted the plan.
Commentators are unevenly divided on the question of whether deemed
acceptance of an unimpaired class under § 1126(f) fulfills the § 1129(a)
(10) requirement. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 1129.02, at 1129-32 (15th
Ed. 1979). Klee, supra note 27, at 137 maintains that the requirement is
satisfied where there is a class of claims that is not impaired, excluding
any class of insider claims. King, supra note 28, at 126 seems to agree
with this construction, but argues that it vitiates the seeming protection
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ruptcy litigation. The key portion of section 1129 (a)
appears to be subsection 1129(a) (8),55 which sets as the
minimum requirement for court confirmation of a plan
under the less stringent "best interests of creditors" test
that every class either accept the plan or be unimpaired
by it. Subsection 1129 (a) (8) is the only condition of
section 1129 (a) which is not an absolute prerequisite under
the fair and equitable test. 6 Should the proponent of a plan
which has met all of the other conditions of section 1129 (a)
fail to obtain unanimous acceptance of the plan, he may
request that the court confirm the plan over the dissent
of one or more classes of claims or interests so long as one
class has accepted the plan.57 If the plan does not discriminate unfairly and meets the fair and equitable test, the
court has no authoritys to reject the plan unless the requirements of section 1129 are met with respect to more than
one submitted plan, in which case the court must consider
the preferences of creditors and holders of equity securities
in choosing among plans.5"
Section 1129(a) (10)," ° therefore, sets the minimum
standard for confirmation, which is that at least one class
of claims or interests must accept the plan. This avoids a
stalemate between the parties by serving as an additional
motivation to dissenting classes to avoid the cram down
provisions of section 1129(b) by accepting a plan which at
least one class of creditors has found acceptable. The prerogative of the proponent of a reorganization plan to use
the cram down provisions so long as at least one class

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

afforded the creditor by § 1129(a) (10). 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
at 1129-32 points out that a requirement of affirmative acceptance can be
easily circumvented. See test accompanying note 72 infra.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1129(b) (Supp. II 1978) specifies
that if all the requirements of subsection (a) other than paragraph (8)
are met, the court must confirm the plan on the request of the proponent,
provided that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and
equitable with respect to each impaired class.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. II 1978) ; 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (10) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. II 1978) states
that the court shall confirm the plan subject to the limitations described
at note 52, supra.
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (Supp. II 1978) excludes the acceptance of a plan by a class of insiders.
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accepts the plan, however, raises the question of whether
section 1129 (a) (10) is intended to require the affirmative
acceptance by an impaired class, or whether the deemed
acceptance of an unimpaired class under section 1126(f)
is sufficient.
The conditions under which classes of claims or interests
may accept a plan are specified in section 1126.61 An
impaired class of creditors may accept a plan only if it is
acceptable to a majority of that class in number and amount
of claims.2 An impaired class of ownership interests may
accept a plan only on the approval of the holders of a
majority in amount of interests of that class. However,
any class of either claims or interests which is not impaired"
under the plan is deemed to have accepted the plan, so that
the proponent of the plan is not required to solicit acceptances from that class."'
The question, then, is whether or not the deemed
acceptance by a class which will lose nothing under the
proposed plan ought to be sufficient to force an otherwise
unacceptable plan on classes of claims or interests whose
positions will be altered by the plan. The requirement that
at least one class accept the plan before the proponent can
resort to cram down suggests that he be able to "sell" 6 the
plan to at least one class, implying something more than
merely satisfying one class in full and thereby obtaining its
passive acceptance. Certainly equating deemed acceptance
with the active acceptance of impaired classes under these
circumstances seems to give the proponent of the plan power
over dissenting classes which seems to contradict the underlying purpose of the codified bankruptcy reform to balance
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (Supp. II 1978).
Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. II 1978) specifies the
situations in which a class is not impaired under the plan.
65. Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. II 1978).
66. Certainly there is some doubt that the requirement that at least one class
accept the plan can be satisfied by the passive acceptance of a class whose
position remains ualtered by the plan. Curiously, the rationale that § 1129
(a) (10) places a responsibility on the proponent to sell the plan to impaired classes has not been addressed by any of the commentators (see
note 54 supra) even though King and Klee participated in drafting the
code and in drafting the COLLIER section.

61.
62.
63.
64.
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more equitably the competing rights of the various parties
in interest. Nevertheless, nothing in the language of Chapter
11 clearly suggests that the deemed acceptance of an unimpaired class is not intended to be the functioning equivalent
of an affirmative acceptance by an impaired class. Indeed,
except for the somewhat ambiguous language of section
1129(a) (8), the Code consistently equates a deemed status
with an actual status throughout its chapters."
The only section of Chapter 11, in fact, which seems
to distinguish between the deemed acceptance by unimpaired
classes and the active acceptance of impaired classes is
section 1129 (a) (8)," which merely specifies that every
class "has accepted the plan or is not impaired under
the plan." Section 1129(a) (10) contains no suggestion that
only impaired classes which have affirmatively accepted
the plan fulfill its conditions, although it does specifically
exclude the acceptance of the plan by any class of insiders"
The obvious argument is that had Congress intended a
distinction between the two kinds of acceptance for the
purposes of satisfying section 1129 (a) (10), the Code would
have provided a stronger clue to that intent than the single
disjunctive "or" in the earlier subsection, especially since
section 1129 (a) (10) provides an alternative course of action
under section 1129 if the conditions of section 1129(a) (8)
are not met.
Section 1126(f) does not provide that a class which
has been deemed to accept the plan must receive different
treatment because it is unimpaired, other than that soliciting
acceptance from that class is not required. Although it has
been argued that the sole purpose of providing for deemed
acceptance under section 1126(f) is to specify that solicitation is not required,"° the presumption is that if permitted
67. 5
68.

COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY

1129.02 at 1128-32 n.47 (15th ed. 1979),

Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8)

(Supp. II 1978)

states that as a condition for confirmation under
must have accepted the plan or be unimpaired, but
to how much of a distinction between the two kinds
to be raised.
69. See note 60 supra.
1129.02, supra note 54,
70. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
ed. 1979).
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to do so, an unimpaired class would vote affirmatively for
acceptance anyway, and that requiring solicitation from
such a class would be redundant and burden the proponent
of the plan unnecessarily.7 ' Furthermore, if section 1126(f)
is insufficient for the purpose of section 1129(a) (10),
proponents of plans could easily circumvent the requirement
by only slightly impairing a class 2 in order to create an
"impaired class" which could give the requisite acceptance.7"
An alternative argument can be made that section 1126(f)
only states that solicitation of active acceptances from unimpaired classes is not required, not that it is prohibited,
and therefore solicitation of active acceptances for purposes
of section 1129(a) (10) converts the deemed acceptance to
an active acceptance for purposes of section 1129(a) (10).7
Either way, the statute could be circumvented, but the bankruptcy procedure would suffer for it."5
The language of section 1129(a) (8) does not clearly
lend itself to an interpretation that the two categories of
classes should be subjected to different treatment."5 Certainly it can be argued that section 1129(a) (8) merely
emphasizes that deemed acceptance and affirmative acceptance carry the same weight in determining whether confirmation may proceed under the best interests of creditors
test of section 1129. Both categories seem to have the same
effect on meeting the conditions of either section 1129(a)
or section 1129(b), since even if an affirmative vote is not
required, a plan may not be confirmed if every class is
impaired or fails to accept. 7
71. Id.
72. For example, this can occur by composition and extension or by offering
the "impaired class" 98% of its allowed claims. Note that 11 U.S.C. § 1124
specifies that any altering of the position of a class constitutes impairment,
which is a departure from the Old Act's requirement that a class be
materially and adversely affected. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 2,
at § 107.
73. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 1129.02, at 1129-32 n.47 (15th ed. 1979).
74. Id.
75. A purpose of bankruptcy reform was to streamline bankruptcy procedure
and these solutions only complicate it.
76. The note in COLLIER suggests that the distinction raised in Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (Supp. II 1978) is merely surplusage.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1129.02, supra note 54, at 1129-32 (15th ed.
1979).
77. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1129.02, supra note 54, at 1129-31 (15th ed.
1979).
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This ambiguity of construction is not well clarified
by the prior law. Under the Supreme Court Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure," acceptance by a class which was not
materially or adversely affected by the terms of the plan
was not counted as an acceptance in acquiring the required
number of acceptances for confirmation.79 Until new Rules
are adopted, the prior Bankruptcy Rules remain in effect,
but only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with
the substantive portions of the new Code.8" Whether the
courts will affirm the current Bankruptcy Rules on the
question of the deemed acceptance by an unimpaired class
as satisfying section 1129(a) (10) remains to be seen.
It has been suggested that section 1129(a) (10) is
related to the Chapter XII cases under the Old Act in which
some bankruptcy courts confirmed the plan by the use of
the cram down provisions where no class accepted it.'
However, Chapter XII cases usually involved only one
creditor, the real estate mortgagee, who retained his security
interest, and was not available to corporate debtors. Furthermore, section 1129(a) (10) appears to require the
acceptance of at least one class before any plan can be
confirmed, apparently to protect creditors by insuring that
their interests will have to be considered in a reorganization
plan. Even so, that protection seems to be countered by
permitting the proponent of an otherwise unacceptable
78. R. BANKR. PROC. § 10-305(a). Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra, note 2 at
§ 179.
79.

9A AM. JUR. 2D Rules of Bankruptcy and Official Forms § 10-305.2 (1976).

There was no deemed acceptance provision for unaffected classes in the
Bankruptcy Rules. R. BANKR. PROC. 10-305 (a). However, holders of claims
which were "deemed allowed" under the Act were entitled to the same
voting privileges as holders of claims which were actually allowed. E.g.,
R. BANKR. PROC. § 10-401(a), 9A AM. JUR. 2D. Rules of Bankruptcy and
Official Forms § 10-305.2 (1976).
80. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Pub. L. 95-598 § 405(d) (1978). A
significant change in the bankruptcy law deals with the effect of the
bankruptcy rules on the new Code. Since 1973, the Supreme Court has
promulgated rules for practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act
subject to its rule-making power under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976). Under the
Act, all laws in conflict with the rules were nullified. Under the Code,
however, the rules may not supersede procedural provisions of the Code.
Trost, et al., supra note 3, at 74.
81. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 1120.02, supra note 54, at 1129-31 (15th ed.
1979) ; King, supra note 28, at 126.
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plan to pay one class in full and thereby obtain its appear82

ance.

Perhaps a more constructive approach should focus
on the consequences of cram down to dissenting classes.
Section 1129 (a) (8) sets the minimum conditions under
which a court must confirm a plan which, in effect, is submitted to it at the unanimous request of the parties in
interest."5 The section emphasizes one of the underlying
motivations for corporate bankruptcy reform: that the
parties themselves and not the bankruptcy courts are best
able to negotiate a plan to protect their own interests. If
the specified majorities of each class agree, the court must
confirm the plan. Any further inquiry by the court should
be directed at insuring that dissenting minorities in each
class are protected and not at questioning the ability of the
affirming parties to negotiate a proper plan. Members of
unimpaired classes are deemed to have accepted the plan
because the protection of their interests is not in issue.
Members of classes which receive nothing are deemed to
have rejected the plan, because the only way to determine,
legally, the extent of their share in distribution of the
debtors estate is through liquidation or through determination of the value of that estate through a valuation hearing.
When one or more classes (as opposed to holders of
claims or interests within a class) reject a plan, the protective role of the court is broadened. Before it can confirm
a plan over the dissent of even one class, it must ascertain
that all the requirements of section 1129(a), other than
section 1129 (a) (8), have been met. Those requirements
include the best interests of creditors requirement of
section 1129 (a) (7) that each holder in each class has either
accepted the plan or will receive at least as much under the
plan as it would have received under liquidation." Secondly,
82. King, supra note 28, at 126.
83. If all classes accept the plan, they endorse the proponent's submitting it
to the court, and in effect, request its confirmation.
84. Other requirements under Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 11 2 9(a)
(Supp. II 1978) include full compliance by both the plan and the proponent
of the plan with Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a) (1) and (2) (Supp. II
1978); that the plan be legal and be proposed in good faith (11 U.S.C.
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the court must determine, through valuation hearing, that
every senior claim will be satisfied in full before junior
interests will be allowed to participate. Because of these
protections, the only way in which a dissenting class can be
injured by the cram down provision of section 1129(b) is
in the potential reduction of the debtor's estate through the
expense of the valuation hearing, or if its members have
miscalculated as to whether the amount realized under the
fair and equitable test will exceed the amount the class
would have received under the plan. The dissenting class
can avoid these risks by consenting to the plan-a result
that section 1129 (a) (8) is designed to encourage. From
the point of view of the dissenting class, it is irrelevant
that the cram down was effected because a class had
affirmatively accepted or had been deemed to have accepted
the plan. The protections and risks to the dissenting class
are the same whatever the nature of the accepting class.
Its only concern is to ascertain whether it would be wiser
to accept the proffered plan or to take its chances with the
valuation hearing.
The dissenting class is not powerless to influence the
nature of the plan. First, assuming that avoidance of a
valuation hearing will be a major motivating factor in
formulating the plan, the option of a class of claims or
interests to withhold its acceptance, and thus require the
proponent of the plan to seek cram down, is itself an
effective instrument to encourage the proponent to propose
§ 1129(a) (3) (Supp. 11 1978)); that there be full disclosure of the identities of any individual who will replace the debtor or act as a director,
officer or voting trustee and that such appointment will be consistent with
the interests of claimants and with public policy and that there will be
full disclosure of any insiders to be employed or retained under the plan
and the nature of their compensation (11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (5) (Supp. II
1978) ; that any payments made in connection with the plan be fully disclosed and that such payment be reasonable (11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (4)
(Supp. II 1978). Furthermore, any rate changes under the plan are expressly conditioned on the approval of any regulatory commission with
jurisdiction over the rates of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (6) (Supp.
II 1978). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (9) (Supp. II 1978) specifies that the plan
provide for the specified treatment of priority claims. Finally, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (11) (Supp. II 1978) conditions confirmation on a determination
that the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need of
further financial reorganization of the debtor unless such liquidation or
reorganization is proposed in the plan. In other words, the plan must be
feasible.
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a plan which will be acceptable to all classes. Secondly, any
party in interest, including a member or representative of
a dissenting class may present an alternative plan to the
court for confirmation if the debtor has not filed a plan
within 120 days from the date of the order for relief85 or
if the plan has not been accepted by every impaired class
of claims or interests within 180 days.8" Furthermore, upon
the request of a party in interest and after notice and
hearing, a court may, for cause, increase or reduce the
120-day period or the 180-day period. Although the statute
does not define "cause", almost certainly a proponent's
invoking the cram down of an unacceptable plan before the
expiration of the 180-day period ought to be sufficient
cause to allow the court to reduce that period to allow
dissenting parties in interest to present an alternative plan,
The alternative plan is subject to the same restrictions
of section 1129 (a) and section 1129 (b) as the debtor's plan.
Since section 1129(a) does not require that the plan be
acceptable to the debtor, it would seem that an alternative
plan which is accepted by all classes of claims or interests
would be preferable to a plan which would have to be
"crammed down", particularly in light of the mandate in
section 1129(c) that the court must consider the preferences
of creditors and equity holders in deciding among plans.8"
Also, an alternative plan which met all of the requirements
of section 1129(a) would have to be confirmed without a
valuation hearing. Only if a class of claims or interests
rejects the alternative plans must the fair and equitable
test of section 1129(b) be applied.
Thus, not only do the alternative plan provisions of the
Chapter safeguard the interests of a dissenting class by
permitting it to file its own plan to avoid having an unacceptable plan forced on it, they provide negotiating leverage
85. Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2) (Supp. II 1978).
86. Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (3) (Supp. II 1978). A party
in interest can also file a plan if, after 120 days, a trustee has been
appointed under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(c) (1) and 1121(b) (Supp.
II 1978).
87. Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (Supp. II 1978).
88. Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (Supp. II 1978).
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during the 120-day period in which the debtor must file a
plan. A debtor who is aware that an alternative plan may
be proposed and confirmed in lieu of his is necessarily
compelled to take the interests of the dissenting classes into
account in formulating and proposing his plan. Again, it
seems to make little practical difference whether section
1129 (a) (10) acceptance is effected by affirmative acceptance of an impaired class or by deemed acceptance by an
unimpaired class.
The foregoing analysis does not answer the question
of why, with these additional safeguards of creditors'
interests, acceptance, deemed or otherwise, should be required of any class before confirmation over the dissent
of other classes is permitted. Nevertheless, before a court
may consider confirmation that acceptance must be obtained.
Those drafters" ' of the Code who have commented on the
cram down question have concluded that deemed acceptance
by an unimpaired class is sufficient for the purposes of
sections 1129(a) (10) and 1129(b). Certainly the Code is
structured to protect the interests of creditors in the event
of cram down, and in such a way that it seems to make little
practical difference how acceptance by a class has been
obtained.
Chapter 11 is clearly designed to promote unanimous
agreement among the parties in interest before a reorganization plan is submitted to a bankruptcy court. There seems
to be universal agreement that the threat of valuation
hearings constitutes considerable leverage in obtaining the
consent of dissenting classes. Whether that purpose extends
as far as allowing cram down where the only accepting class
is a class which is not affected by the plan awaits interpretation and definition in the courts. The question will
surely be raised.
Mary E. Galvan

89. See note 54 supra.
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